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MUSICAL CHAIRS AND TALL BUILDINGS:
TEACHING POVERTY LAW IN THE
21ST CENTURY
Amy L. Wax*
I. INTRODUCTION
America has not yet abolished poverty.  The definition and
proper measure of poverty have long been a subject of controversy,
and there is no consensus on how many people in the United States
are poor.1  But no one denies that the poor continue to be with us.
This is unlikely to change soon.
It does not follow from this that poverty should be addressed—
or will continue to be addressed—as a distinct subject within the
law school curriculum.  Indeed, the status and future of this area of
inquiry within law schools is somewhat in doubt, even as the sub-
ject retains some vitality.  In the most recent American Association
of Law Schools Directory of Law Teachers, this area of teaching
and research is denominated “welfare law.”2  The names of law
faculty listed under this rubric fill about a page and a half, with
most individuals indicating that they are not actively teaching a
course.3  The “big name” law schools (U.S. News and World Report
top twenty) are not very well-represented on the list.  Although
Yale Law School has a disproportionate number of professors who
acknowledge interest in this field, no one at Harvard or Chicago is
listed as teaching welfare law.4
As someone who attended college and law school in the 1970s
and 1980s and then went on to teach law in the 1990s, I can attest
that welfare law was once a more popular course than it is today.
But its position has always been tenuous.  Poverty has never been
considered a mainstream part of the law school curriculum; nor has
it commanded a central place in legal scholarship.  There are signs
that its popularity has, if anything, recently waned.  Michigan, for
example, for many years offered a well-attended poverty law class
* Robert Mundheim Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1. For a recent review, see Nicholas Eberstadt, The Mismeasure of Poverty, 138
POL’Y REV. 19 (2006).
2. See AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS: 2006-2007, at 1427-29 (Association
of American Law Schools, Washington, D.C., 2006).
3. Id.
4. Id.
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taught by faculty member and then dean Jeffrey Lehman.  He has
since left Michigan for Cornell, and that high-profile Michigan
course no longer exists.
What accounts for welfare law’s current status and continuing
marginalization?  Because poverty law is not a core part of a tradi-
tional legal education, it has no standard, agreed-upon curriculum.
What is taught in poverty law is up for grabs and is heavily influ-
enced by the interests and convictions of the faculty instructor.
Not surprisingly, courses are highly variable, and their contents
have evolved in response to political developments and shifting no-
tions on the causes and cures of economic disadvantage.
Prompted by a heightened concern with the rights of the poor
and especially with the dire situation of American blacks, welfare
law courses began to appear in law schools in the 1960s.  The pres-
entation and design of these initial courses were strongly informed
by left-leaning assumptions about the nature of poverty and its ori-
gins.  On this view, economic deprivation is a product of an unjust
economic and social system ripe for reform.  Many proponents be-
lieved that inequities could be addressed through an agenda of pol-
icies, regulations, and programs designed to work fundamental
changes in the functioning of government and the structure of soci-
ety.  The ultimate goals were laudable, if somewhat naive:  to rec-
tify injustices, procure a better deal for poor people, enhance the
power of the disadvantaged, and improve their lives.
The appearance of these courses historically coincided with the
enactment of Great Society initiatives and a dramatic expansion of
New Deal programs such as Aid for Families with Dependent Chil-
dren (“AFDC”).  The roles these courses envisioned for lawyers
included not only pressing for the enactment of new laws and poli-
cies designed to protect the interests of the poor, but also advocat-
ing for vigorous judicial enforcement of existing ones.  In keeping
with lawyers’ comparative advantage, the legal piece of the project
increasingly came to be viewed as a matter of procuring “rights”
and maximizing entitlements within a system that, it was thought,
systematically worked to undermine them.  Thus, although the as-
pirations expressed in these courses were vaunting and potentially
quite far-reaching, the scope of their immediate concerns was, in
actual practice, somewhat technical and limited.  Many poverty law
courses had a clinical focus and were preoccupied with litigation
strategies.  Meeting the immediate legal needs of poor people
within the existing system became the chief priority.  Litigation
centered around a mix of positive and negative entitlements: pro-
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tecting the poor from landlords and employers, enforcing proscrip-
tions against race and class discrimination, rectifying inequalities in
education and other services, and procuring a panoply of govern-
ment benefits.
To the extent that some courses were more analytical, concep-
tual, and critical in their approach, strong assumptions were often
at work.  Students were invited to ask how the system could better
be designed to protect the poor and improve their lot through re-
distribution or other measures.  A consensus emerged that the sys-
tem was at fault.  The poor were the victims of unjust structures
and social arrangements.  It followed that the system was in dire
need of reform.  The focus was on what could be done for and to
people.  The immediate priority was meeting the poor’s most press-
ing needs and giving them the resources they were lacking.  The
broader agenda was to produce a more fundamental change so that
the poor could acquire more power, more money, and more of the
good things in life.  The strategy that emerged relied heavily on
governments, with a panoply of new official programs proposed to
transfer resources and transform the lives of the least well off.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF WELFARE LAW
During the 1970s and 1980s, the problem of poverty failed to
yield to programmatic efforts and, in some ways, actually got
worse.5  These decades were a period of increasing awareness of
and impatience with inner city poverty, especially among the black
population.  The perceived failure of many War on Poverty initia-
tives created political polarization, with calls to “do something”
about the dramatic increase in out-of-wedlock childbearing, family
disintegration, racial unrest, crime, drug dealing and use, educa-
tional failure, and other developments associated with economic
and social deprivation.  The continued expansion of entitlements
like AFDC and the food stamps program became “hot button” is-
sues on which the electorate was sharply divided.6  Some saw these
initiatives as contributing to social disorder, while others saw them
as essential to the just treatment of an increasingly deprived
population.
5. See, e.g., CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY,
1950-1980 (1984) (describing explosive growth in the number of fatherless families
below the poverty line receiving federal welfare benefits between 1960 and the mid-
1980s).
6. Id. at 124-26, 196 (calling “no topic . . . more controversial” and the debate
“vigorous”).
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The political salience of poverty fueled activity within academia
and the policy community.  What to do about continuing depriva-
tion became a widespread and well-funded pre-occupation.  A cot-
tage industry, extending to non-profit policy organizations,
government agencies, and think tanks across the political spectrum,
sprung up to deal with poverty’s stubborn persistence and the inad-
equacy of existing programs.  Although left-leaning thinkers had
long been concerned with these issues, analysts on the right began
to get into the act.  In particular, the idea that welfare assistance
programs were not the solution to the problem of poverty but actu-
ally part of the problem gained currency.
Charles Murray’s influential 1984 volume Losing Ground ar-
gues, in effect, that welfare causes poverty.7  Welfare, maintains
Murray, robs the poor of initiative and breaks up families by en-
couraging men not to marry the mothers of their children but in-
stead to abandon them.8  Welfare provides an incentive for women
to obtain benefits by bearing children outside of wedlock.  It dis-
courages work by providing cash and non-cash benefits that
amount to better compensation than could be earned through em-
ployment.9  For Murray, the best way to lessen poverty is to abolish
all welfare programs.10
A few years later, Myron Magnet, in The Dream and the
Nightmare, advanced a broader cultural theory to explain the per-
sistence of poverty.11  Like Murray, Magnet believes that the
poor’s lack of drive and determination and their unwillingness to
work hard were crucial.12  But unlike Murray, Magnet located the
source of these behaviors not primarily in economic incentives but
in culture.13  For Magnet, the chief job of any civilization is soul-
craft: the transmission of the bedrock values of mature, educated,
honest, hardworking, caring, and responsible people.14  The poor
represent society’s failures, those who have not inherited the cen-
tral “bourgeois” values of the mainstream culture.15  Those values
came under attack by the liberationist ethos and ideas of the
7. Id. at 9.
8. Id. at 157-59.
9. Id. at 162-64; compare graph id. at 158 with graph id. at 161.
10. Id. at 219-23.
11. MYRON MAGNET, THE DREAM AND THE NIGHTMARE (1993).
12. Id. at 15.
13. Id. at 15-16 (describing the “underclass culture they live in”). But see id. at 32
(stating “I am not arguing that the problem is a ‘culture of poverty’ . . . .”).
14. Id. at 26-32.
15. Id. at 30-32.
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1960s.16  That attack undermined the very habits and beliefs that
would have enabled the poor to better their lot.17
Murray and Magnet share the conviction that the economic sys-
tem, uncorrupted by meddlesome and perverse government pro-
grams, provides the prerequisites for the success of all people.
Both accept that ample opportunities exist within the current struc-
ture for able-bodied individuals to achieve  a self-sufficient, decent
life.  For Magnet, welfare programs are not the primary culprit;
rather, the adoption of bad ideas has proved pernicious.18  Al-
though Magnet blames a perverse cultural shift, he concedes that
welfare worsens the situation by reinforcing the belief that the
poor are not responsible for their behavior, that they cannot over-
come their problems through hard work, and that welfare is some-
thing to which they are “entitled.”19
For those interested in the problems of the disadvantaged, the
work of Murray and Magnet could not be ignored.  These authors
challenged ways of thinking about poverty that were dominant in
the legal academy.  But the challenge was not just in the realm of
theory.  In thinking about causes and cures, poverty studies in-
creasingly took an empirical turn.  Reams of data were collected by
think tanks, academic social scientists, and government agencies.
Experts sought to describe and characterize poverty with the hope
that new understandings would point the way towards effective
cures.
The information generated in this effort created a new apprecia-
tion of the complexities of the problem.  These insights could not
help but work a sea change in the way economic deprivation was
addressed within the law school curriculum and in other university
courses.  The growing recognition that poverty is a tangled amal-
gam of social, behavioral, and economic factors necessarily forced
an abandonment of many of the assumptions behind the old-style
poverty law courses.  One could say that the old welfare law frame-
work got mugged by reality. Although some offerings still hewed
closely to that paradigm, a new-style welfare law course was born.
What are the characteristics of this new-style welfare law course,
and how does it differ from the old poverty law of the 1960s and
1970s?  Inspired by my experience as a Columbia Law student in a
social welfare law and poverty class taught by visiting professor
16. Id. at 31.
17. Id. at 30-31.
18. Id. at 59-62.
19. Id. at 134-35.
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Cass Sunstein in the mid-1980s, I decided to develop such a course
when I began teaching at the University of Virginia Law School in
1994.  I continue to teach the same course at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School today.  The new welfare law course rele-
gates law, as conventionally understood, to but a minor part of the
syllabus.  In addition, litigation and advocacy no longer have pride
of place.  The focus is not on championing the poor by expanding
and enforcing their rights through the judicial process.  Nor is the
task primarily to teach students how to advocate for the poor
through the enforcement of existing rights and the enactment of
new and more generous entitlements.  Rather, the approach is far
more analytic, agnostic, and broad-gauged: to understand the
sources and causes of deprivation, and to think carefully about the
full range of instruments and tactics to address it.
To be sure, the new approach to welfare law still retains a rather
precarious foothold within law schools.  The subject matter of a
course like this cannot be adequately addressed without taking on
complex policy issues.  Indeed, any well-designed course in this
area is properly entitled welfare law and policy.  The heavy mixture
of non-legal materials will make the course seem even more “un-
conventional” and “irrelevant” than before.  For students, the per-
tinence to a future legal practice is not immediately obvious.  Some
students will find these unorthodox attributes attractive and some
will find the course useful for future careers in government or legis-
lation.  But others can’t or won’t “waste time” on this class.
In addition to confronting doubts about the course’s relevance
and importance, law professors teaching such a welfare course face
other challenges.  The course makes heavy demands.  Because
there is no set curriculum, instructors must create their own sylla-
bus.  This can be an arduous process.  The field is dynamic and
ever-changing, so substantial revisions in teaching materials are re-
quired from year to year.  The subject matter is far-ranging and
calls for an interdisciplinary approach.  The professor should of
course be familiar with intricate federal and state benefits pro-
grams designed to address disadvantage and redistribute income.
He or she should also be learned in the aspects of tax law, adminis-
trative law, family law, and constitutional law that bear on the sub-
ject matter.  On top of that, instructors should ideally possess more
than a passing knowledge of social science subjects like labor eco-
nomics, demography, social psychology, sociology, liberal political
theory, and the sociology of education, and should try to keep
abreast of relevant developments in these dynamic fields.  Since
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much of the work in these areas is empirical and quantitative, the
instructor should also have some familiarity—and comfort—with
the methods of ethnography, statistics, and regression analysis.
All in all, this is a tall order.  These demands can be hard on
teachers and students alike.  Yet taking them on in this context
holds rewards.  Many issues that form the core of social welfare law
and policy are treated piecemeal in other parts of the curriculum.
Economic, legal, and social aspects of disadvantage are addressed
in courses on race, feminism, taxation, and constitutional law.  But
much of what is interesting and important gets missed.  Social wel-
fare law and policy offers the opportunity to consider disadvantage
more comprehensively and to integrate insights from other offer-
ings and perspectives.
III. MUSICAL CHAIRS AND TALL BUILDINGS:  FOUR
DICHOTOMIES IN WELFARE LAW
As a teacher of welfare law and policy, I have concluded that the
problems of social and economic disadvantage are best analyzed
within a framework that rests on a handful of critical distinctions.
Over time, four pairs of contrasting concepts have emerged as use-
ful: inequality and poverty; structure and placement; external
forces and individual performance; and causes and cures.  Explor-
ing these dichotomies helps organize the inquiry, dispel confusion,
and shed light on key issues in social welfare.
The first of these distinctions raises an important initial question:
What is the relationship between poverty and inequality as a
whole?  Poverty law courses have traditionally focused on the most
deprived segment of society—“the poor.”  Poverty law is about ec-
onomic disadvantage.  But, as fifty years of academic research and
practical politics have revealed, it is difficult to cabin that subject.
The problem is a lot more complicated than we thought, and an
inquiry into poverty cannot avoid confronting social disadvantage
and difference in all its aspects.  It is difficult to do justice to that
subject without discussing economic and social disparities in gen-
eral.  Indeed, one could argue that the proper subject of a social
welfare law and policy course is inequality.
Framing welfare law and policy as a course on inequality has ad-
vantages.  Inequality has long been considered a proper concern of
the law school curriculum.  It goes without saying that myriad laws
in many areas make some people better off and decrease the wel-
fare of others.  And many laws are directly designed to mitigate
inequality or reallocate tangible and intangible resources.  Because
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law affects the distribution of wealth, position, and other social
goods, law and inequality are closely intertwined.  Assuming that
laws are the official instruments of collective action, one can regard
social welfare law and policy as a course primarily about the dis-
tributive consequences of such collective decision making.  Private
conduct has distributive consequences too, and these also come
within the purview of the inquiry.  Indeed, it is a crucial part of this
project to assess and disentangle the relative contributions of offi-
cial enactments and private decisions to the distribution of social
goods within society.
None of this is to deny that poverty should be the prime focus of
a welfare course.  Indeed, any welfare course worth its salt should
begin by considering whether, and why, the most deprived—those
stuck, as I put it to my students, on the “lowest rung” of society’s
ladder—should elicit special concern.  The point is only that depri-
vation is best understood in the context of the overall distribution
of benefits and burdens within society.  The inquiry should begin
with a broad investigation of sources of economic and social dis-
parity generally.  Only then is it fruitful to analyze the nature of the
relationship between inequality and disadvantage and to explore
what (if anything) should be done about either.
In unpacking these questions, two key issues arise.  The first is a
pragmatic one about economies like our own that operate on free
market principles.  Such capitalist economies appear spontaneously
to generate significant economic dispersion.  Will systems like ours
necessarily leave some people behind—so far behind that they are
unable to meet basic needs?  Or can robust capitalism co-exist
comfortably with less poverty and more equality than is observed
in the United States today?  The second issue concerns whether
poverty is an absolute or relative phenomenon.  Will the people on
the bottom rung of the ladder, even if reasonably well-provided
for, necessarily view themselves as poor?
Both issues have generated serious disagreement.  Alexis de Toc-
queville, in his magisterial Memoir on Pauperism (the piece with
which I open my social welfare course), anticipates and discusses
both these questions.20  Taking the proper measure of the contro-
versy today requires an interdisciplinary approach and attention to
data.  Work in social psychology suggests that what matters to peo-
ple is how they are doing relative to others: being located at the
20. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, MEMOIR ON PAUPERISM (SEYMOUR DRESCHER
TRANS., IVAN R. DEE 1997) (1835).
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bottom of the heap generates feelings of deprivation.21  Epidemio-
logical work from Britain, including studies on British civil ser-
vants, provides evidence that being in a low status job, even if it
provides for basic needs, compromises health.22  On the other
hand, there are ways in which today’s poor are better off than even
middle class people were only a few decades ago.  Life expectancy
and standards of living have increased across the board, with many
of the least-well-off today possessing comforts, conveniences, and
gadgets (such as televisions and microwave ovens) unknown to
previous generations.  There is thus room to argue about the actual
status of those on the lowest rung and whether and how the gov-
ernment should intervene to improve their lot.
The second distinction that is critical to a proper study of poverty
is that between two elements frequently conflated: structure and
placement.  Those poles are closely related to the third dichotomy:
between external forces and individual performance.  One trope
that helps elucidate these relationships is the game of musical
chairs, which is familiar to every student.  A group of children sur-
rounds a circle of chairs.  There are enough chairs for all but one
(or some) of the players.  The music starts and the children walk,
hop, or skip around the chairs.  When the music stops, they scram-
ble for a seat.  The person or persons left standing are “out.”
The losers in the game are stand-ins for society’s losers—those
who somehow fail in the competitive game of life.  These are the
people who end up poor.  Why do some people lose the game of
musical chairs?  Their fate can be attributed both to the rules of the
game and to the players’ own performance.  That chairs are missing
is a fixed part of the game.  The fact that there are too few places to
sit dictates that someone must lose:  someone will be ejected from
the game on each round.  That “structural” feature is not of the
players’ creation and is not within their control.  On the other
hand, which players will be out?  Here a different set of factors
comes to the fore.  Who loses the game is a matter of performance.
In shedding light on distinctions between structure and place-
ment, and between extrinsic factors and performance, the game of
musical chairs not only illustrates those categories, but also shows
how outcomes can be the mixed product of very different kinds of
factors.  The game’s rules mandate that someone will be without a
chair.  That is independent of anyone’s personal attributes or be-
21. See, e.g., ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCI-
ETY (1995).
22. See, e.g., MICHAEL MARMOT, THE STATUS SYNDROME 78-79 (2004).
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havior.  But an individual’s fate within the game—whether he sur-
vives repeated rounds or eventually loses out—is very much a
function of how the player conducts herself.  The game rewards the
most competitive players.  Musical chairs is useful thus in illuminat-
ing the distinction between external factors and individual
performance.
The game is likewise helpful in drawing the conceptual distinc-
tion between structure (the number of chairs plus the rules of
play), on the one hand, and the placement of individuals within the
structure (who wins, who loses, and how many there are in each
category), and in showing how these can sometimes operate inde-
pendently.  Another helpful metaphor for this relationship can be
found in James Galbraith’s Created Unequal.23  Galbraith draws a
contrast between the shape of the economy as a whole (analogous
to a skyscraper or tall building with a set number of floors of fixed
size) and the position, or level, occupied by specific individuals
within the building (analogous to the floor on which each person
resides).24  Galbraith analogizes the building to the economy as a
whole, with particular emphasis on the structure of labor mar-
kets.25  He writes, “[t]he wage structure, that is, the shape of the
building and the number of spaces available on each floor, is a built
structure.”26  Galbraith also advances a particular theory of the ori-
gins of this structure.  In his view, “[i]t is a product of history, built
up by the rules, institutions, and political forces that influence how
the economy works.”27  But he acknowledges that not all embrace
this account.  Some neoclassical economists believe that labor mar-
kets are largely independent of politics and institutional priori-
ties.28  Rather, competitive free market forces dominate.  Supply
and demand for goods and services, levels of technological devel-
opment, and the availability of wealth for investment determine
the quality and quantity of jobs on offer and fix the levels of com-
pensation.  From this perspective, these factors are fairly autono-
mous within competitive economies and subject to only limited
effective manipulation.
Leaving aside the question of whether the structure of the sys-
tem is politically “constructed” or chiefly the product of difficult-
23. JAMES GALBRAITH, CREATED UNEQUAL 55 (1998).
24. Id. at 55-56.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 55.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 61-65.
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to-manipulate free-market forces, the main point is that, for partic-
ular persons living within the system, the overall shape of the
building, in Galbraith’s metaphor, is a given.  It is independent of
the positions particular individuals come to occupy.  In Galbraith’s
example, residents cannot directly control this structure or the
number and position of places it provides.29  Rather, they take the
building as they find it.  Where individuals end up within the struc-
ture, however, is another matter.  As with musical chairs, it is
largely a function of how they perform within the constraints estab-
lished by space limits and the rules for shuttling between floors.  In
other words, “[t]he demographic composition of the distribution of
people across the floors . . . is a matter of [people’s] individual
characteristics and of how those characteristics are treated.”30
Exploring the relationship between external forces and perform-
ance, as illustrated by the metaphors of tall buildings and musical
chairs, gives rise to a host of difficult questions.  What is the nature
of the characteristics that lead to victory (in musical chairs) or high
placement (in Galbraith’s metaphor) and how do people acquire
them?  In both cases, final outcomes rest on performance.  But
what determines performance?  In musical chairs, the losers may
be those who possess fewer talents and attributes needed to follow
the rules or excel at the game.  Or perhaps the losers tried less hard
then others, or have had less experience.  These suggestions reveal
that performance is a product of contrasting inputs.  Innate endow-
ments play a role.  But choices, strategies, and cultivated attrib-
utes—such as experience, determination, and effort—also affect
outcomes.  Musical chairs, for example, is a meritocracy with a lim-
ited number of places and prizes.  Winning at musical chairs de-
pends on merit defined as natural talent put to good use.  But how
well people perform is ultimately the mixed product of endow-
ments, luck, circumstances, and personal effort.  In this respect, the
game resembles our own society.
Likewise, Galbraith’s tall building can be regarded as a mer-
itocracy of sorts.  His metaphor gives rise to a similar set of ques-
tions.  How much of a person’s placement is due to her own
choices and how much to forces over which she exerts little or no
control?  What is the role of endowments like talent, ability, tem-
perament, or upbringing?  Can the crucial choices be viewed as
closely conditioned or constrained by these givens, or do people
retain a meaningful amount of freedom and discretion to deter-
29. Id. at 55-56.
30. Id. at 55.
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mine their own fate?  Finally—and perhaps most importantly—
why does the system assign people who possess certain attributes
or display certain behaviors a position on particular floors, whether
high or low?  What gives rise to the rules for transfer between
floors?  Why does society elevate some and demote others?
These types of questions—and the distinctions that help eluci-
date them—are crucial to understanding poverty and economic in-
equality in the United States and deciding what to do about it.
One persistent fault line in discussions of disadvantage in America
is the distinction between the deserving and the undeserving poor.
As Martin Gilens has documented, voter surveys, focus groups,
and data collected by social psychologists reveal that these catego-
ries are firmly entrenched in political discourse and strongly influ-
ence citizens’ views on welfare policy and economic
redistribution.31  The differential treatment of the deserving and
undeserving in turn implicates the distinction between impersonal
social forces and performance.  Is deprivation due to chance—that
is, factors or events beyond people’s control?  Or is it due to
choice—that is, a person’s own decisions and behavior?  These
questions have powerful resonance.  Most people stand ready to
assist the disadvantaged through centralized public welfare pro-
grams only if the recipients are needy through no fault of their
own.  In judging whether people meet this standard, voters apply
the expectation that able-bodied persons will make reasonable
good faith efforts to achieve economic self-sufficiency.  Persons
who fall short of this expectation are not generally regarded as en-
titled to public assistance.32
The categories of the deserving and undeserving poor, so popu-
lar among voters, have come under relentless attack by academic
commentators.  Some claim that the popularity of the deserving-
undeserving distinction is informed by nefarious motives like ra-
cism.33  Others question the very concept of desert as incoherent.34
The status of desert is a bone of contention within liberal political
theory and is particularly important within a branch known as luck
egalitarianism.  The latter holds that a just society is one in which
individuals are charged with responsibility for bad choices but not
31. MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE 91-93 (1999).
32. See, e.g., Amy L. Wax, Something for Nothing: Liberal Justice and Welfare
Work Requirements, 52 EMORY L.J. 1, 5 (2003).
33. See, e.g., GILENS, supra note 31, at 139-40, 214-15. R
34. See, e.g., LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP 32
(2002).
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-4\FUJ410.txt unknown Seq: 13  6-SEP-07 13:22
2007]STRUCTURAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW COURSE 1375
for bad luck.  Luck or undeserved endowments are morally arbi-
trary and ought not to influence individual prospects and the distri-
bution of social goods.35  But differential outcomes that are the
product of individual free choice are not unfair.  On this view, soci-
ety is obligated to take steps to equalize or compensate for defi-
cient natural endowments or other unchosen or uncontrollable
factors.36  In the context of social welfare, this obligation extends to
relieving at least some types of poverty, including deprivations in-
flicted by forces or conditions a person cannot control.
Identifying these conditions is not simple, however.  The differ-
ence between outcomes due to choice and those conditioned by
chance is sometimes hard to discern.  Because it is notoriously dif-
ficult to sort out and classify contributions to inequality, the precise
scope of the collective obligation to mitigate disadvantage is dis-
puted even among those who embrace basic luck egalitarian com-
mitments.  These complications are reflected in a split within
liberal political theory on the very meaning of desert.
First, while some maintain that the distinction between choice
and chance is not only valid but robust, others in effect question
whether there is any such thing as meaningful choice.  For those in
the latter camp, all outcomes look to be fatally tainted by external
factors.37  On that view, no rewards within our society can mean-
ingfully be viewed as “deserved.”
Second, even among those who believe in desert, there is no
clear consensus on what should count as a compensable endow-
ment, with disputes over the status of such factors as cultural back-
ground, inborn talents, and material accidents of birth.  Are effort
and prudence just the products of family environment or innate
temperament, as some liberal theorists suggest?38  Or do individu-
als make meaningful decisions, for which they can justly take
credit, to cultivate good character and live up to moral ideals?
Even if they sometimes do, how important are talent and other
natural abilities, compared to effort, character, or prudence, for
35. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS
287, 288 (1999).
36. For a review of luck egalitarian arguments, see for example, RONALD DWOR-
KIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 320-50 (2000) or ERIC RAKOWSKI, EQUAL JUSTICE 2 (1991).
37. Compare, e.g., RAKOWSKI, supra note 36, and DWORKIN, supra note 36 (claim- R
ing that choice is meaningful), with JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 81-98 (rev.
ed. 1999) (impugning pre-institutional desert and implying that even good character
and right conduct are mainly the product of endowments), and MURPHY & NAGEL,
supra note 34, at 106 (same); see generally Wax, Something for Nothing, supra note 32 R
(collecting sources on this controversy and luck egalitarianism in general).
38. See generally MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 34; RAWLS, supra note 7, at 104. R
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particular social rewards?  The apportioning of responsibility can-
not always be answered in the abstract.  Rather, it may depend on
social and economic context and the particular outcomes under
consideration.
These inquiries beg a further set of questions that arise when
confronting the special problems of the disadvantaged.  Is self-di-
rection a real possibility for most people within our society?  Might
extreme childhood deprivation, for example, significantly under-
mine the ability to exercise meaningful choice?  Given their insular
lives, can the poor really advance?  Are all people really so free to
climb or fall that they can reasonably be held responsible for where
they end up?
One way to approach these questions is to ask whether the op-
portunity to achieve basic economic self-sufficiency is available to
able-bodied persons of all backgrounds who are determined to
make a decent life and get ahead.  What circumstances would sat-
isfy this condition?  At a minimum, it could be argued, society must
provide a reasonably well-functioning economy that makes em-
ployment widely available to individuals with divergent levels of
skill.  In addition to ensuring that people who “play by the rules”
can live a minimally decent life, society must also provide the pre-
requisites for self-development.  As part of this, it must maintain
social institutions designed to prepare people for the world of
work, including well-functioning public schools that provide all
with the opportunity to develop the skills for constructive citizen-
ship and economic advancement.  Higher education should also be
open to everyone who has attained enough proficiency to complete
advanced schooling.
Whether these prerequisites for self-help prevail in the United
States today is hotly contested.  Those who believe in the “oppor-
tunity society” point out that basic education and employment are
widely available.  They insist that jobs of some kind can be ob-
tained by virtually all who aggressively seek them.  Public schools
provide basic instruction to those determined to learn, and few ca-
pable students are turned away from college due to inability to
pay.39  Most recognize that the government has a role in pursuing
policies of a general kind that ensure minimal economic well-being.
These arguably may include measures, such as subsidies for work-
ing families or progressive tax policies designed to “make work
pay,” that allow people of all ability levels to live decently.  They
39. See discussion infra.
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-4\FUJ410.txt unknown Seq: 15  6-SEP-07 13:22
2007]STRUCTURAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW COURSE 1377
note, however, that tax and transfer policies—including food
stamps, public health insurance for poor children, and the Earned
Income Tax Credit—are currently in place to help ensure that
those who behave prudently will enjoy a minimum standard of liv-
ing.  Although acknowledging that achieving a decent life may
sometimes require great effort, especially among the less skilled,
defenders of the status quo insist that the necessary steps are well
within the reach of most persons regardless of background or ori-
gins.40  An oft-repeated formula for escaping poverty and achieving
self-sufficiency involves three elements: complete high school, take
a job and hold it, and marry after school but before bearing chil-
dren.41  The assertion is that the three-part formula for success
would seem to be well within the grasp of ordinary, able-bodied
people within American society today.
Those who would question all of the above rely primarily on two
types of arguments.  As previously discussed, the notion that peo-
ple can in fact engage in these simple behaviors and “save them-
selves” is regarded by some as overly simplistic and impractical.
Forces beyond people’s control effectively prevent this.  For many
people, circumstances make it so difficult that economic advance-
ment is not realistically within their grasp.  In addition, the system
is designed so that some people must fail.  Indeed, many individu-
als who behave prudently are still struggling or falling through the
cracks.
These assertions pose an empirical question concerning exactly
what obstacles persons with few skills and advantages actually face.
Is it really possible for everyone at the bottom to improve their
situation or are there “structural” limits on how many people can
do so?  In implicating the relationship between performance and
broader structural forces, these questions probe the musical chairs/
tall-building metaphors.  Is the structure of our building really
fixed, or is there some elasticity?  Can we reconfigure the build-
ing—perhaps by providing more space at higher levels?  Can we
change the game of musical chairs by adding chairs?  The practical
40. E.g., JUAN WILLIAMS, ENOUGH 215 (2006).
41. This three-part formula for escaping poverty, first proposed by Isabel Sawhill
and Christopher Jencks, was recently restated by Juan Williams.  “Finish high school,
at least.  Wait until your 20’s before marrying, and wait until you’re married before
having children.  Once you’re in the work force, stay in: take any job, because build-
ing on the experience will prepare you for a better job.”  Juan Williams, Getting Past
Katrina, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2006, at A17.  Williams adds that “[a]ny American who
follows that prescription will be at almost no risk of falling into extreme poverty.
Statistics show it.” Id.; see also generally WILLIAMS, supra note 40. R
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aspect of these inquiries cannot be separated from normative ques-
tions about why the current structure exists.  Once again, much de-
pends on whether, as Galbraith suggests, the building’s
configuration is a product of historic accident, political interests,
and institutional choices, or whether it is the outgrowth of imper-
sonal market forces.  But whether it is open to us to radically trans-
form the status quo does not end the inquiry.  We can ask, for
example, why our system rewards particular attributes—such as
talent—and what the consequences might be if the reward struc-
ture were altered.  Thus even assuming we know how to change the
structure, the question is whether we should and what price will be
paid if we do.  For example, if talent and hard work are rewarded
because they create wealth and lead to the efficient satisfaction of
human wants, then muting those rewards might undermine some of
these goods.  But if talent is rewarded because it serves the powers
that be, revising the rules of compensation might prove less costly
for overall well-being.  More generally, any proposal for change
begs the question of whether the proposed transformation will gen-
erate unintended and undesirable consequences.  The question
comes down to what works:  assuming we want to do so, can gov-
ernment action improve the economic structure and/or the fate of
individuals within it?
That question is thrown into sharp relief by concerns over rising
inequality within the American economy.  A steady stream of sto-
ries in the press documents a dramatic exacerbation of this trend in
the United States over the past few decades that has, if anything,
recently accelerated.42  The distribution of income has become
skewed towards the top, with the share of resources going to the
highest-earning one percent of Americans doubling between 1980
and 2004 to sixteen percent, and the share going to the top 0.1 per-
cent more than tripling over the same period, to seven percent.43
Such factors as globalization of capital and labor, the decline of
labor unions, growing returns to skill and education, and higher
42. See, e.g., Joel Kotkin & David Friedman, Rebuilding the Middle Class, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 3, 2006, at M6; Thomas Lemieux, Increasing Residual Wage Inequality:
Composition Effects, Noisy Data, or Rising Demand for Skill?, 96 AM. ECON. REV.
461 (2006); Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, The Evolution of Top Incomes: A
Historical and International Perspective (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 11955, 2006); Arloc Sherman & Aviva Aron-Dine, New CBO Data Show
Income Inequality Continues to Widen: After-Tax-Income for Top 1 Percent Rose by
$146,000 in 2004, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Jan. 23, 2007, http://www.
cbpp.org/1-23-07inc.htm.
43. See The Revenge of the Bell Curve, ECONOMIST, Oct. 7, 2006, at 20.
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costs for basics like housing, education, and health care, are all
thought to contribute to these patterns.  Additional factors like the
class and race divergence in family structure, the increase in assort-
ative mating, and the emergence of “winner take all” markets may
also be influential.44  Although some of these are a function of indi-
vidual or private behavioral choices writ large, others lie beyond
the direct control of persons or social groups and are largely inde-
pendent of values and behavior.  Most of these trends are not com-
pletely understood or are not readily manipulated by known policy
instruments.  Taxes and public benefits programs can mitigate
some effects, but their efficacy is limited and all pose the potential
threat of undesirable consequences.  Proposals designed to reduce
inequality must confront questions of feasibility, efficacy, fairness,
costs, and consequences.
Not everyone believes that rising inequality warrants interven-
tion.  Some take the position that, since individuals have the power
through prudent action and good choices to better their economic
situation and avoid poverty, altering the distribution of resources is
not the business of government.  As already discussed, how indi-
viduals fare within the existing economic structure often depends
on whether they pursue an education, live prudently, abide by the
law, work steadily, and get and stay married.  Likewise, whether
particular individuals end up poor is, in significant part, a function
of their conduct in these areas.  The three-part formula noted
above for escaping poverty and achieving basic self-sufficiency ac-
knowledges that personal conduct matters.  Becoming a single par-
ent, being voluntarily idle, dropping out of school, and breaking
the law all compromise success.  Once again, the impact of those
choices begs the hard questions of how many of these decisions are
effectively within individual control.  But however these deeper
questions are resolved, it is clear that our capitalist free market
society assigns rewards to those who are willing to grasp basic
opportunities.45
44. For a succinct review of these trends, see John Cassidy, Who Killed the Middle
Class, NEW YORKER, Oct. 16, 1995.  For a shortened version of Cassidy’s article, see
John Cassidy, Death of the Middle Class, NEW INTERNATIONALIST, Issue 281 (1996),
available at http://www.newint.org/issue281/death.htm.
45. In suggesting that behavior is important to eventual economic position, Law-
rence Mead states that “[t]he middle class and the poor appear to exemplify two dif-
ferent economic personalities.  The first has responded to adversity with greater
effort, the other with less.” LAWRENCE M. MEAD, THE NEW POLITICS OF POVERTY:
THE NONWORKING POOR IN AMERICA 83 (1992).
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Although even Galbraith concedes that behavior matters, there
is still the structure to contend with.  Galbraith’s discussion of the
tall-building metaphor implies that the existence and size of the
poor population are a function of broad structural forces.  On this
model, the level of the building’s lowest floor and the number of
people perched there are fixed ahead of time.  If so, then all this
talk of behavior and performance is a cruel distraction.  Individual
conduct only affects which individuals end up in which positions.
As in the game of musical chairs, someone is destined to be ejected
from the game—that’s an intrinsic feature of our system.  The poor
will always be with us, and that’s no one’s fault.
It is on this point that some proponents of an “opportunity soci-
ety” would reject Galbraith’s construct.  Galbraith’s metaphor of a
tall building seems to assume that the number and height of the
floors, and the slots available on each, are prescribed and unalter-
able.  Likewise, in musical chairs, the number and position of the
chairs are a given and are unaffected by how the players play the
game.  The very rigidity of these features, however, limits their
value in illuminating our economic system and detracts from their
pertinence to key issues in social welfare.  The distinction between
structure and placement is not so crisp in practice.  In fact, these
elements are dynamically interrelated.  It is here that these meta-
phors’ application to the real world potentially breaks down.
There is good reason to believe that the number of people who
can attain different levels of well-being in our economy is fluid,
with significant room for modification.  Moreover, the shape of the
economy as a whole and the choices individuals make within it can-
not be so neatly separated.  The level of the floors and the number
of people who take their place on each partly depend on personal
behavior and culture.  In other words, the degree of inequality and
well-being overall are importantly affected by performance.
This perspective implicitly assumes that achieving basic self-suffi-
ciency is not a zero-sum game.  There are some behaviors which, if
adopted by everyone within the existing system, would sharply de-
crease the absolute number of people in poverty.  It seems obvious
that a society in which many people marry and stay married and
drug use and crime are low would be one in which fewer people
would be poor.  If everyone hewed to basic standards of conduct—
for example, if everyone followed the three-part formula detailed
above—no one would be worse off and many would find their lot
improved.  But if this is so, the number of residents on the lowest
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floors need not be a constant.  A corollary is that higher floors
have room for more.
Private sexual and reproductive behavior is especially important
in this regard.  Family structure has diverged dramatically by class
as well as race over the past few decades.46  Although the age of
marriage has increased for all groups, class differences in overall
marriage rates are stark, particularly among whites.47  Lifetime
marriage rates have declined for women with less education, while
the affluent and well-educated still marry and stay married at high
rates.48  A similar pattern is evident for single-parent families.  In
this decade, the percentage of children born out of wedlock has
increased to about twenty-five percent.49  But out of wedlock
childbearing is unevenly distributed.50  The rate has climbed to
over thirty-five percent for women with a high school education or
less.51  In contrast, the percentage of children born out of wedlock
to white women with four years of college or more remains in sin-
gle digits.52  Finally, trends have diverged for divorce, with rates
stabilizing and then declining since the 1980s among the well-edu-
cated but continuing to rise among those of lower socioeconomic
status.53  These developments for marriage, out of wedlock
childbearing, and single parenthood have exacerbated inequality in
society as a whole.54  The rise in single-parenthood among those
who can least afford it has increased the numbers in poverty.  As
Charles Murray has observed, the single parent family is not, and
46. David T. Ellwood & Christopher Jencks, The Spread of Single-Parent Families
in the United States Since 1960, in THE FUTURE OF THE FAMILY 25-65 (Daniel P.
Moynihan, Timothy M. Smeeding & Lee Rainwater eds., 2004) (identifying broad
trends in family disruption according to race and class); David T. Ellwood & Christo-
pher Jencks, The Uneven Spread of Single-Parent Families: What Do We Know?
Where Do We Look for Answers?, in SOCIAL INEQUALITY 3-77 (Kathryn M. Neck-
erman ed., 2004) (providing statistical data on many axes of family life and structure).
47. See Sara McLanahan, Diverging Destinies: How Children Are Faring Under the
Second Demographic Transition, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 607, 607-27 (2004).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Ellwood & Jencks, The Spread of Single-Parent Families in the United States
Since 1960, supra note 46, at 41. R
53. See Megan M. Sweeney & Julie A. Phillips, Understanding Racial Differences
in Marital Disruption: Recent Trends and Explanations, 66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 639,
643 (2004); Steven P. Martin, Trends in Marital Dissolution by Women’s Eductaion in
the United States, 15 DEMOGRAPHIC RES. 537, 560 (2006) (noting declining divorce
rate among well-educated whites).
54. See generally McLanahan, supra note 47. R
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never will be, a viable economic unit, save for the very rich.55  A
single parent must play two roles—caring for children and earning
a living—that wives and husbands traditionally assumed together.
As a result, many single-parent families end up poor.56  Indeed, the
vast majority of all poor families in the United States today consists
of mothers with children.57  Two-parent families, in contrast, have
far lower poverty rates.58
Paradoxically, marriage and family stability are especially impor-
tant in improving the economic status of people with little educa-
tion and few skills.59  If families at the bottom of the income scale
were stronger, family income would be less dispersed and current
levels of inequality would shrink.  Relatedly, if parents, however
unskilled, would join forces through marriage to raise children to-
gether, many families would be lifted above the poverty line and
fewer children would grow up poor.  To carry forward Galbraith’s
analogy, these behavioral changes would improve the well-being of
people on the building’s lowest floor.  Alternatively, they would
alter the distribution of the building’s population as a whole.  Many
fewer people would reside on the lowest levels.  By implication, the
building would “expand” to make room for more individuals on
higher floors.
This elasticity may not hold to the same degree for every step
that poor individuals might take to try to improve their own lives.
The analysis may be somewhat different for factors like education,
where the value generated is at least partly positional.  In bemoan-
ing the tendency to muddle the distinction between structure and
placement in discussions of inequality,60 Galbraith suggests that ed-
ucational reform is often mistakenly cited as an effective anti-pov-
erty measure or as a way to reduce inequality.61  He points out that
a change in the quality or quantity of education society offers is not
55. Charles Murray, What to Do About Welfare, COMMENTARY, Dec. 1994, at 26-
34.
56. See Amy L. Wax, The Failure of Welfare Reform, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2006, at
Current 1.
57. Hilary Hoynes et al., Symposium, Poverty in America: Trends and Explana-
tions, 20 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 47, 48 (2006).
58. Id. at 53-54.
59. See, e.g., Robert I. Lerman, Effects of Marriage on Family Economic Well-
Being, available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/HSP/marriage-well-being03/summary.htm;
Robert I. Lerman, How do Marriage, Cohabitation, and Single Parenthood Affect the
Material Hardships of Families with Children?, available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/HSP/
marriage-well-being03/SimpPaper.htm.
60. GALBRAITH, supra note 23, at 55. R
61. Id.
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-4\FUJ410.txt unknown Seq: 21  6-SEP-07 13:22
2007]STRUCTURAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW COURSE 1383
an enduring solution to poverty, because such reforms will do noth-
ing to alter “the height of the building or the number of places on
each of the floors.”62  As he explains,
An increase in the supply of educated people . . . does not by
itself create more spaces on the top floors.  Instead, as education
increases, more of the existing slots will be filled by workers of
higher qualification. . . .  Average levels of education will rise on
the middle and lower floors.  Positions on the topmost floors ac-
tually become ever harder to break into, and more remote.63
Galbraith’s point is that the economy will not necessarily gener-
ate jobs appropriate for a more educated populace.  Nor will the
number of positions available at each level inevitably increase.  Al-
though selected individuals might benefit from more education,
such reforms need not reduce overall inequality or decrease the
number of people who are poor.
Galbraith’s concern with the potential zero sum effects of pro-
viding more education is not wholly unwarranted.  Offering more
educational opportunity will not cause low-paying service jobs to
diminish in number.  There will still be plenty of jobs at this level,
and someone must fill them.  Indeed, the demand for service jobs
has, if anything, increased recently with expanding numbers of the
very affluent.  Nor will educational improvements necessarily in-
crease the compensation for these positions.  Whether demand for
service workers will result in higher pay depends on labor supply—
and that in turn depends on the availability of other jobs for
workers.
Galbraith’s view that education only affects placement and has
no consequences for structure is probably overly pessimistic.  Gal-
braith’s analysis assumes that the number, type, and compensation
for jobs that the economy generates is fixed and unaffected by the
population’s level and quality of education.  But this need not be
so.  The economy is not static.  There may be a dynamic interplay
between the availability of human capital and labor markets.  De-
clines in the dropout rate or increases in learning or achievement
can shape economic development and overall prosperity by en-
couraging expansion and investment in enterprises that depend on
skilled labor.
Although Galbraith arguably implies too sharp a divide between
factors bearing on placement and structure, his insights are none-
62. Id. at 56.
63. Id.
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theless valuable in drawing attention to the contribution of per-
sonal choices as well as systemic factors to inequality and
deprivation.  The evidence indicates that observed patterns are a
mixed function of individual performance and broader societal
structures.  Those structures are in turn influenced by private deci-
sions, economic forces, and social policy.
IV. WELFARE POLICY THROUGH METAPHOR:  WHAT IS
TO BE DONE?
Recognizing the distinctions between placement and structure,
and between private and social forces, is essential to any rigorous
analysis of how the problems of deprivation and inequality should
be addressed.  These categories must be kept in mind in consider-
ing various options for government intervention, policy change, or
legal reform.  Once problems are properly categorized, then the
right questions to ask are these: Can the government change the
structure?  Can the government change behavior?  What aspects of
the system will yield to politics and policy, and which are beyond
the reach of those instruments of collective action?  Experience has
taught that some problems may be effectively alleviated by govern-
mental action, while others resist manipulation through policy and
are less responsive to programmatic initiatives.  Although there is a
great deal of disagreement about which problems fall into either
category, it is important to air those controversies fully and fairly in
any social welfare course.
In answering the question “What works?” it makes sense to start
with what governments do best.  Prime areas for government inter-
vention are those that yield to uncomplicated solutions, such as
throwing money at the problem.  Our economy provides a large
number of low-paid service jobs.  We do not yet know how to
change this—that is, we have no ready formula for significantly
raising the “wage level” of the building’s lowest floor.  But there
would seem to be a role for public policy in ensuring that individu-
als at the bottom who play by the rules and work hard do not end
up poor.  To that end, certain programs already in place have
proven effective in improving the lot of low-paid workers without
generating intolerable side-effects.  The Earned Income Tax
Credit, in particular, has helped to lift many working families
above the poverty line.64  As a boost to hard-won earnings, it re-
64. See, e.g., Anne Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Oversimplified
Case for Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533, 539-41 (1995).
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wards people who behave responsibly and strive for self-support.
In addition, other work-related programs that states have devel-
oped under federal welfare reform mandates have been success-
ful.65  Programs that help workers find reliable transportation and
that subsidize child care offer effective supports for low-wage
workers.66  These programs need not be initiated by government.
Private efforts may also make important contributions to the
poor’s well-being.67
Another device for helping residents of the building’s lowest
floor is the minimum wage.  There is currently a lively debate
about whether this method is ultimately self-defeating or whether
it is an effective mechanism for helping the least well-off.68  Those
critical of the minimum wage tend to buy into a neoclassical view
of labor markets:  wages are determined primarily by the economic
forces of supply, demand, and profit margins.69  They argue that
raising the minimum wage hurts those it is designed to help by gen-
erating higher unemployment.  The most vulnerable and least em-
ployable workers are most likely to be priced out of the market.70
Other economists believe that economic forces alone do not so
precisely fix wages.  Rather, there is enough “play” in the system to
support potentially positive outcomes from minimum wage hikes in
some circumstances.71  Recent empirical research using the “natu-
ral laboratory” of minimum wage differences between states has
provided some evidence that raising the minimum wage need not
lead to higher unemployment or lower profits for businesses and
may leave many low-wage workers better off.72
65. Thomas Corbett, The New Face of Welfare: From Income Transfers to Social
Assistance?, 2 SOC. POL. & SOC’Y 113, 113-15 (2002).
66. Id. at 118.
67. See, e.g., Michael Fitzgerald, Thinks Big About the Little Guy, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 4, 2007, § 3, at 1; see also Joseph P. Friend, From the Hope Program, A Path to a
Fresh Start, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2007, § 3, at 19.
68. See Gary S. Becker & Richard A. Posner, How to Make the Poor Poorer,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2007, at A11 (summarizing economic arguments against the min-
imum wage); Edmund Phelps, The Importance of Inclusion and the Power of Job Sub-
sidies to Increase It, OECD Econ. Studies No. 31 (2000) (discussing shortcomings of
minimum wage rules).
69. Becker & Posner, supra note 68. R
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., GALBRAITH, supra note 23, at 145. R
72. See David Card & Alan B. Krueger, Minimum Wages and Employment: A
Case Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, 84 AM. ECON.
REV. 772, 792 (1994); see also Eduardo Porter, Revisiting a Minimum-Wage Axiom,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2007, § 3, at 3.
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A far more difficult task confronts those who would address the
behavioral aspects of poverty and inequality.  Particularly salient in
this regard are problems like drug use, crime, family fragmenta-
tion, and educational failure.  These patterns have a well-docu-
mented impact on economic success.  Addressing these difficulties
is complicated by the fact that they are not evenly distributed in
the population, but are especially acute among blacks and on the
increase among Hispanics.73  Both of these groups continue to be
disproportionately poor.74
A key divide within the political and policy community is be-
tween those who believe that governments have an important role
to play in correcting or reducing dysfunctional behaviors and those
who think that the government’s ability to address these problems
is necessarily modest.  Those who look to government see poor
performance as, at bottom, a response to adverse social condi-
tions.75  If government can somehow remove or alleviate those, the
behavioral problems will abate and disappear.  On this perspective,
“social engineering” can transform social life.  In contrast, others
see these problems as intransigent to external or official manipula-
tion.76  Dysfunctional behaviors are a matter of private choice and
conduct, which are primarily shaped by informal norms. Change
cannot be imposed.  Rather, it must be self-initiated.
The perspective that looks to government fits best with a particu-
lar vision of human decision making that sees conduct as the prod-
uct of material conditions and external constraints.  Adverse
circumstances—not individual or cultural differences—are the ulti-
mate causes of disadvantage.  Dysfunctional behaviors are best re-
garded as a “functional” or “rational” reaction to hardship,
deprivation, or discrimination inflicted by others.77  These under-
standings are the hallmark of what David Brooks calls “sociologi-
73. See generally New Century Foundation, The Color of Crime: Race, Crime and
Justice in America, Second Expanded Version (2005).
74. Daniel T. Lichter, Zhenchao Qian & Martha L. Crowley, Race and Poverty:
Divergent Fortunes of America’s Children?, 24 FOCUS 8, 14 (2006).
75. MEAD, supra note 45, at 2. R
76. Id.
77. For a characteristic statement along these lines, see J. David Greenstone, Cul-
ture, Rationality and the Underclass, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 399, 403 (Christo-
pher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991). See also Linda M. Burton, Teenage
Childbearing as an Alternative Life-Course Strategy in Multigeneration Black Families,
1 HUMAN NATURE 123, 124 (1990).
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cal thinking.”78  This outlook also fits with an embrace of
situationism, the belief advanced by some social psychologists that
variations in external conditions rather than individual differences
account for most observed behaviors.79  This perspective can be
contrasted with a more moralistic, character-based focus on indi-
vidual virtue and initiative.  The character-based view comports
with a robust conception of moral freedom and the possibility of
meaningful choice.  It also acknowledges a distinct role for group
culture, values, and traditions in influencing the conduct of group
members for good or ill.
Those who stress the influence of culture on behavior point to
evidence that people with contrasting traditions and attitudes differ
in their response to external constraints in ways that bear on eco-
nomic success.  Bourgeois virtues and a robust work ethic enhance
productivity, and attributes like conscientiousness, which some cul-
tures may foster more than others, are linked to occupational effec-
tiveness.80  Lawrence Mead, for example, has suggested that how
people cope with setbacks, challenges, and hard times may be me-
diated by cultural assumptions that help define class.81  He states,
“[t]he middle class and the poor appear to exemplify two different
economic personalities.  The first has responded to adversity with
greater effort, the other with less.”82 In addition, the importance of
culturally conditioned habits of behavior can be observed world-
wide and across nations, with evidence that productivity-enhancing
attributes can contribute to the health of the economy as a whole.
Consider, for example, some Scandinavian countries’ signal success
in maintaining economic growth while simultaneously reducing in-
78. On the dichotomy between character discourse and the sociological view, see
David Brooks, Virtues and Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2006, § 4. See also JOHN M.
DORIS, LACK OF CHARACTER (2002).
79. See, e.g., DORIS, supra note 78, at 146 (reviewing social psychological evidence R
on the role of dispositions and situational influence).  The embrace of situationism has
not been uncontroversial, as there is considerable evidence in social psychology and
experimental economics that individual characteristics and dispositions do predict be-
havior. See, e.g., David Lubinski, Scientific and Social Significance of Assessing Indi-
vidual Differences: Sinking Shafts at a Few Critical Points, 51 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL.
405, 405 (2000); Walter Mischel, Toward an Integrative Science of the Person, 55 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 1, 19 (2004); Daniel J. Ozer & Verónı́ca Benet-Martinez, Personality
and the Prediction of Consequential Outcomes, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 401, 416
(2006).
80. See, e.g., Barrick et al., Personality and Performance at the Beginning of the
New Millennium: What Do We Know and Where Do We Go Next?, 9 INT’L J. SELEC-
TION & ASSESSMENT 9, 21-22 (2001).
81. MEAD, supra note 45, at 83. R
82. Id.
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equality and poverty through redistribution and high taxes.83  Al-
though economic policies have undeniably played some role, a
culture that fosters social order, skill development, and solidarity
has surely been an important factor as well.84  These types of cul-
tural influences are largely a product of private, historical, and in-
formal forces.
In its antipathy towards cultural distinctions as explanations for
behavior and in its commitment to “situationism” as a central prin-
ciple of human affairs, sociological thinking makes little room for
notions like sound values, moral virtue, or self-help.  The assump-
tion that external circumstances both explain and dictate human
response regards the notion of spontaneous self-correction as both
unjust and incoherent.  The idea of surmounting social conditions
and besting adverse circumstances through the embrace of superior
or more functional values plays little role in this world view.
The sociological approach feeds into a belief in the necessity and
the efficacy of external solutions to social problems.  The notion
that observed behavior is the expected outgrowth of existing pat-
terns means that material and social circumstances are crucial to
outcomes.  Because human beings are the playthings of social
forces, the power to manipulate and transform human response
must lie with outsiders or society as a whole.  Dysfunctional behav-
iors represent a “rational” response to ambient conditions, so indi-
viduals cannot be expected to change until conditions improve.  It
follows that better performance is impossible without structural re-
forms.  It is incumbent on society to “produce” the necessary trans-
formations.  Government must solve the problems of the poor.
Policy experience to date challenges this approach.  The cluster
of behaviors that creates the risk of falling into poverty has so far
proved resistant to manipulation through any known reforms or
government intervention.  There is growing evidence that patterns
like low educational attainment, premature and extra-marital
childbearing, paternal abandonment, and criminal activity have
their roots within early, private experience and are reinforced by
informal social forces and values.85  Families and the immediate so-
cial circle shape attitudes and attributes that put people at risk.
Early influences are particularly crucial in establishing key habits
83. See, e.g., Jonathan Cohn, Great Danes, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 1-15, 2007, at 13-
15.
84. See id. at 17.
85. See KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA KEFALAS, PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR
WOMEN PUT MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE 4 (2005).
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and understandings.  The failure of governmental efforts directed
at countering or overriding these influences begs the question of
whether such measures can succeed.  To the extent that values and
culture are the dominant forces behind dysfunctional behavior,
there is little evidence that the government can effectively
intervene.
Consider, for example, the declining rate of marriage among the
less educated and less well-off segments of the population in recent
decades.  The Bush administration has recently proposed initiatives
designed to strengthen and encourage marriage.86  But there is no
evidence that pro-marriage programs work or have any effect at
all.87  Some scholars of the family assert that marriage is not “the
solution” to economic deprivation because the men poor women
would marry are abusive, irresponsible, and financially insecure.88
But these attributes are in turn dependent on behavior.89  Single-
motherhood is an important engine of economic disadvantage.90  If
more men would behave like good husbands, this development
would go a long way towards alleviating poverty among the least
well-off.  Nonetheless, most of those who look to government to
solve the poverty problem do not see marriage as a reasonable
anti-poverty measure.91  On the assumption that solutions must
come from government, this stance makes some sense:  it’s not ob-
vious how the government can produce more and better marriages
among the target population.  Certainly, government programs can
do little to influence the behaviors that make men marriageable.
Those who look to private initiatives, on the other hand, will recog-
nize that marriage enhances security and economic well-being and
that marriage is attainable.92  For them, the problem of low mar-
riage rates is amenable to self-help.  It is up to the people them-
selves to see that marriage is desirable and then to respond by
behaving appropriately, getting married, and staying married.  The
power lies within the poor to alleviate their own situation.
86. See, e.g., id. at 3.
87. Frank Furstenberg, Can Marriage Be Saved?, DISSENT, Summer 2005, at 5-6.
88. EDIN & KEFALAS, supra note 85, at 76, 216. R
89. See Amy L. Wax, Too Few Good Men, 134 POL’Y REV. 69 (2006).
90. See David J. Eggebeen & Daniel T. Lichter, Race, Family Structure, and
Changing Poverty Among American Children, 56 AM. SOC. REV. 801, 803 (1991); see
also Lichter, Qian & Crowley, supra note 74, at 14. R
91. EDIN & KEFALAS, supra note 85, at 4 (discussing how the Bush administra- R
tion’s “marriage cure” has infuriated the political left).
92. See id. at 3.
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V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Essay is to articulate a vision of how a social
welfare course should be designed and the issues that it should con-
front.  Given what we know and what we have learned in past de-
cades, any course in social welfare law and policy must consider the
contribution of individual and systemic forces, and of behavior and
structure, to the problems of inequality and poverty within our so-
ciety.  This exploration inevitably will reveal fault lines of political
conviction and belief and will grapple with social science data and
programmatic experience.  Finally, courses on social welfare within
law schools will inevitably confront practical questions.  In past de-
cades, advocacy was the watchword.  Poverty law was directed at
developing litigation tactics under existing law to procure rights
and resources for the poor.  The goal was to improve people’s lot in
life and meet their immediate needs.  That focus is still valid, but
time and experience have revealed its limitations.  The content of
some welfare law courses has consequently shifted to accommo-
date political realities and practical failures.  In the wake of 1990s
federal welfare reform, most policies are now designed to reward
those who, in the words of former President Bill Clinton, “work
and pay the taxes, raise the kids, and play by the rules.”93  To the
extent that deprivation is still in part “structural”—that is, the
product of larger economic and institutional forces shaping labor
markets, economic opportunities, and the distribution of wealth—
programs like work-support and tax credits for the working poor
are now the instruments of choice.  But decades of experience and
study have revealed that some poverty is rooted in behavior.  And
programmatic attempts to improve performance have taught us
that understanding causes does not necessarily point the way to
effective solutions.  Because behavior is hard for governments to
control, the study of poverty reveals the limits of the government’s
power and counsels a more modest approach to what it can
accomplish.
93. Bill Clinton, Acceptance Speech to the Democratic National Convention (July
16, 1992).
